Source: K. Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich (London, 1973), pp.51-90.
The German government offices and military sections - the army, navy, SS, Economics Ministry and Colonial Office - were already hurrying on ahead with preparations on the colonial front. A few days before the "advance on Prague" - a snubbing shock to the Western Powers, even if they were still not shaken into action by it - Hitler officially gave the order of unimpeded preparations for the annexation of colonial territory 101 . The full implications of this instruction can only be recognised if we are acquainted with Hitler's simultaneous directive concerning the accelerated build-up of the navy. According to his wishes, this was to be completed by 1944, while the naval leaders only envisaged achieving this aim by 1945 or later 102 . While still in the first, continental, stage of his Program, Hitler was already ordering preparations for the colonial annexations of the second stage and the build-up of naval strength necessary for it. His instructions clearly reveal the long-term aims emerging in his ideas, which were to be achieved according to his Program after attaining continental hegemony and Lebensraum in Eastern Europe. In the second half of the 1940s, the task would be to "show the United States a bold front" - either together with Britain in the role of a junior partner, or against Britain's will. Then, in harmony with the objectives and wishes of the navy and some branches of industry 103 , a position for Germany as an Atlantic and colonial world power would be established. These long-term colonial aims, which had always been latently present, had been deliberately set aside during the period when a settlement was being sought with Britain. But they had never been completely abandoned and now they re-emerged - somewhat earlier than Hitler had expected - in the wake of the anti-British course. In this, the aims were thoroughly in accord with the existing needs in German society - though admittedly these could well have been satisfied through peaceful expansion.
While the fuss on the Czech powder-keg was still burning Hitler was already thinking about his next continental move. When the Polish Foreign Minister Beck visited him in January 1939, Hitler presented him with his plan of overrunning Russia in alliance with the Poles 104 . Thus by 1939 it seems as if Hitler had decided first to march against the East, including Russia, and then to turn to the West and France, in bringing the first stage of his plan to its completion. Afterwards he intended to confront the USA, and- if necessary - Great Britain. But Beck reacted with hesitation, as a result of which the "minor" Eastern solution moved into view 105 . The road to 3 September 1939, and - in Hitler's view - the senseless war with the reversed fronts was emerging. While von Ribbentrop, working in the context of his anti-British "alternative" conception, succeeded in bringing Hungary into the Anticomintern Pact, negotiations were taking place in France which kept alive the hope that Hitler's war course could still be halted after all by diverting the Germans economically towards colonial business. For when the German economic experts, led by Weigelt, director of the Deutsche Bank, met the French, things went very promisingly 106 . These semi-official attempts by the French side to divert the Reich onto a peaceful course were complemented by the official British policy which was stated once more by the British Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson in a note to Halifax, the British Foreign Minister, on 9 March 1939 107 . Yet again Great Britain showed itself willing to let the Reich have supremacy in Central Europe, both directly - politically - and indirectly, by economic means. But Britain was not prepared to allow the Reich to pursue an expansionist policy without bounds. A limit was drawn which was completely compatible with Neville Chamberlain's concept of appeasement.
Meanwhile Hitler was setting about "liquidating" the map of Czechoslovakia - the " Rest-Tschecher ", as it was contemptuously called in Nazi terminology; there was talk of the "Greater German World Empire". It is true that the propaganda under Goebbels' direction prohibited the usage of this concept. Yet it was by no means absolutely banned, but rather - as was said, significantly enough - reserved for use at a later time 108 .
How would the British react now to Germany, when for the first time Hitler openly stepped beyond the limits of the policy of revisionism and erased yet another European state, Czechoslovakia, from the face of the map? Chamberlain's speech delivered in Birmingham on the 17 March 1939 109 has usually been understood as the resolute reply to Hitler's move of 15 March, and as the great turning-point in British foreign policy 110 . Certainly, the warning undertones of this speech, departing from the original written draft, could hardly be ignored. But seen in the longer term what remained unmistakable was that soon afterwards Chamberlain once again took up his concept of a realistic policy of appeasement towards the Germans as the only way of safeguarding peace and with it the status of Britain as world power. This attitude in British policy was also to make itself evident in the Polish crisis, just breaking out under Hitler's instigation. It was the Polish crisis, again initiated under the banner of a propaganda barrage about the Reich's colonial demands, which was finally to lead to the Second World War.
E. The Polish Crisis and the Unplanned War
The British Government's attitude had not changed fundamentally, and if they now handled the German dictator more firmly, they did not lose sight of the actual concept of "peace and settlement" in doing so. This was revealed very soon in the declaration the British made on 31 March 1939 111 guaranteeing the protection of Poland. The British government emphasised that it was prepared to protect the existence of Poland and to intervene for the sake of Polish national sovereignty in the event of its being "clearly threatened". Nevertheless, this did not mean, as has at times been asserted, that Britain would guarantee the frontiers of Poland at any price. Thus there remained quite enough room for manoeuvre in negotiations between Germany and Britain for the two most decisive nations in European politics to find a compromise at the expense of Poland which, though it appeared as a major power, was clearly of second-rate importance compared to Britain and the Reich. The much-discussed Polish guarantee declared by Britain cannot, therefore, be basically understood as demonstrating a British readiness to go to war, such as clearly emerged after the Prague provocation. Of far more concern here is the extreme effort the British government made to save the basic European status quo by agreeing to modifications they could still just tolerate. They were striving at the same time to meet by way of the negotiating table the threatening claims the Germans were making on colonial possessions. British policy, firm and conciliatory at one and the same time, thus sought to discover Hitler's real intentions and then to negotiate over them. London advocated a peaceful solution, which left enough leeway to enable them to come to a compromise with the Dictator. That is, they sought a solution, which permitted Germany a position of partial hegemony in Europe, yet which was at the same time still just tolerable to the vital interests of Britain and which allowed them then to discuss colonial problems. However, it was the Fuehrer's intention to achieve all these aims and other far more extensive ones by means of war.
The more decisively Hitler adopted the course of war, the more intensively did Chamberlain struggle to begin a political dialogue. But Hitler's expansionist intentions were quite evident in a discussion he had with Burckhardt, the High Commissioner of the League of Nations in Danzig 112 . The Fuehrer talked of pursuing his Eastern policy either in alliance with Poland, or of bringing his more wide-reaching plans in the East to their fulfillment after having completely subjugated the small neighbouring state. This talk between the Swiss diplomat and the German dictator was taking place in an international situation already almost hectically beyond control. On 23 March 1939, German troops marched into the Memel district, and on the same day a German-Rumanian economic agreement was concluded. Unlike Goering and Wohlthat, Hitler did not regard this step as implying a peaceful "alternative" to his policy of expansion by war. Neither could it bring him to seek economic compensations in south-east Europe in pursuit of an "economic appeasement" along the lines of British reasoning. On the contrary, the Rumanian oil supplies fell more and more into the hands of the Reich - a prerequisite of the economic war machine necessary for the Dictator's forthcoming lightning campaigns. Four days later, on 27 March 1939, Spain became a member of the Anticomintern Pact. In view of this at least visually impressive front 113 stretching from "Madrid to Yokohama", which was very soon able to include even Stalinist Russia as a well-disposed neutral country, and in the light of his experience of the English gained in his previous surprise blows on the Continent, Hitler must surely have thought that Great Britain would persist in her neutral attitude in the event of further European ventures. Only one month later, Hitler, agreeing with the wishes of the navy and in line with his own strategic concept, let himself be persuaded to denounce and cancel the numerous stipulations of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement 114 . Hardly any more obstacles now stood in the way of implementation of "Plan Z". The growing fleet could already be used as a means of threatening Great Britain, locking her away in the cupboard of neutrality while also providing Germany with the means later to pursue a successful policy of world power after her victories over Russia and France.
In view of the obvious war course adopted by the German dictator, the American President, Roosevelt, now made an appeal to Hitler to maintain peace 115 . As well-versed diplomatic experts knew, the USA would always intervene on the side of London in the event of a change in the European or world situation endangering Britain 116 . A chief reason for this, no doubt, was to protect their own various economic interests in Europe, but it was also in order not to endanger their strategic security in the Atlantic largely guaranteed by the British fleet, which enabled them to concentrate their own navy in the Pacific against Japan. The USA was observing the game being played by the European powers in an alert and - for Hitler - threatening way. And even if the Fuehrer firmly rejected Roosevelt's attempt at intervention in a masterly display of demagogy 117 , the future shape of the Anglo-Saxon alliance was nevertheless already emerging. Hitler had never lost sight of the contest between the German and American world powers for the long-term political future of the Reich. Precisely for that reason Hitler was painfully intent, up to December 1941, upon keeping the economic and political potential of the United States out of a conflict with Germany 118 until he had achieved the first stage of his Program, the hegemony which would guarantee self-sufficiency. In the USA people were meanwhile beginning to grasp the strategy and tactics of the Dictator - namely of making political demands on the colonial front in order to notch up gains on the Continent 119 . At the same time in Germany, the 2nd Air Fleet of Goering's Luftwaffe - like the navy in February and March 1939 - was preparing a study which foresaw Britain as the chief enemy 120 . Very soon this was to become reality - but before the German armaments had grown sufficiently for Hitler to be prepared to extend his activities overseas.
On 23 May 1939, the Fuehrer delivered an address to the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces 121 , which his military adjutant, Schmundt, noted down in brief and rather unclear shorthand. Here Hitler was completely preoccupied with the Polish question. He touched on long-term strategic aims 121a only in remarking that it was precisely from a secure base won on the Continent, safe from blockade, that the blow could best be struck against the West. In principle Hitler was planning to repeat the attempt which Ludendorff had undertaken after the German victory in the East and the Brest-Litovsk Peace 122 , when it seemed unlikely that Germany could be starved into submission and all forces could be concentrated on the Western front. Hitler wanted to conquer Poland in a lightning war, incidentally the only strategic possibility left open by the Reich's armament preparations "in breadth" but not "in depth" 123 . When the Fuehrer spoke of being prepared for a long war, which could take the shape of a war of attrition against Britain, he probably intended the remark rather as reassurance for the officers present. Or perhaps it was envisaged as a possibility for the distant future when Germany, master of a vast continental empire, could defy Britain at sea and endanger the supply routes of the British Empire.
While the Chamberlain government in Great Britain was, as ever, still trying to meet Berlin halfway in order to achieve a reasonable settlement, it also, in a dilatory way and under pressure from Conservative dissenters round Churchill 124 , began negotiations for an alliance with Soviet Russia. It was Churchill's plan, regardless of all the social and political differences between the systems, to re-establish the pre-war alliance and, in reply to Hitler's policy of provocation, to encircle him from all sides' 125 . Neville Chamberlain, however, on the one hand possessed of a deep antipathy towards Bolshevik Russia, and on the other, mindful of the disastrous mechanism of the alliance system at the outbreak of the First World War, submitted only unwillingly to this wish of Churchill's. He left negotiations in Moscow to subordinate representatives and continued to hold fast to the bilateral line with Berlin.
In the meantime, Stalin had recognised very well the preference the British Prime Minister showed for an agreement with National Socialist Germany. He feared a coalition of the capitalist and fascist states against Communist Russia, in which Hitler's armies would strike out against the USSR as the spearhead for British interests. The Russian Dictator drew the conclusions from his analysis of the international situation. His speech before the XVIIIth Party Congress of the CPSU (B) on 10 March 1939, in which he declared that the Ukraine felt in no way threatened, was correctly understood as a bait by Berlin 126 . The path to 23 August 1939 was being paved; Stalin's concept of foreign policy, which he had been following since 1925 of not letting the capitalist states unite against him was becoming clear 127 . The fact that he correctly assessed Chamberlain's policy, at least in respect of his efforts to reach an agreement with Germany, is revealed in the latter's attempts to hold talks with Hitler, made again and again right up to a few weeks before the outbreak of war.
On 13 June Sir Nevile Henderson proposed negotiations 128 . So far as territorial questions were concerned, admittedly, there was only meant to be discussions on the overseas areas; the decisive subjects of the talks otherwise would be the problems of the arms race and trade exchanges. In London they evidently thought they would still be able to make economic concessions to the Reich as well as to suggest a revision of the German-Polish frontier, which would guarantee the basic existence of Poland as a state. London was thus prepared under certain circumstances to allot to the Reich spheres of indirect interest on the Continent in the firm belief that Germany, deeply shaken economically, was particularly dependent on the offer of economic appeasement. Then, after granting these just about tolerable concessions, they believed negotiations would move into their second phase on the problem of colonies. But on the German side it was only the diplomats and specialists in the economic field who were interested in these British proposals. For Hitler was determined to bring his Stufenplan to realisation, either in the shelter of British neutrality, or - if necessary - against Britain's will. For this reason the controversial talks between Sir Horace Wilson, Chamberlain's confidant, and Wohlthat, the Minister from Goering's Four Year Plan staff, hardly seem to have bothered Hitler. It still remains unclear to this day who arranged these negotiations so shortly before the outbreak of war 129 . While Wilson, acting completely in line with Chamberlain's strategy, appealed for talks on the Polish question and sought to win the Germans round to establishing a peaceful world with the familiar concessions, what does seem interesting is that it was an economics expert from the group round Hermann Goering who was discussing these plans for the German side. That is, Wohlthat was basically seeking in these discussions a peaceful, economic "alternative" in opposition to Hitler's policy. Do these negotiations perhaps conceal a final attempt on the part of Goering to direct Hitler from the path of war? Was Goering trying to eliminate the economic bankruptcy of the Reich brought about by the rapacious build-up of armaments by means of economic advantages won in the course of a strong but peaceful foreign policy - while the Dictator was intending to cover the financial deficit of his regime by fighting a war of conquest?
Further private and semi-official, at times quite improbable-sounding, offers and negotiations between the representatives of the two nations were at the time occupying the minds of well-informed contemporaries 130 . Yet none of them could gain any influence over the foreign policy decided upon by Hitler. In his "most extraordinary declaration" made to the Swiss Commissioner for the League of Nations, Carl J. Burckhardt, Hitler once again revealed the motives behind his actions. Everything that I undertake is directed against Russia. If those in the West are too stupid and too blind to understand this, then I shall be forced to come to an understanding with the Russians to beat the West, and then, after its defeat, turn with all my concerted force against the Soviet Union. I need the Ukraine, so that no one will starve us out as they did in the last war.' 131 Was Hitler laying a bait here, via Burckhardt? Was he trying forcibly to demonstrate to Britain just one more time the advantage of adopting a neutral course, or perhaps the advantage of an alliance against Russia, so different socially - an alliance which would only be possible for a short period of time of course, in view of the strengthening of the navy? 131a
Perhaps these words of Hitler's should be seen in connection with the "generous offer" he made on 25 August 1939. While the British government was indefatigably trying to move Hitler to talks, von Weizsaecker, the German State Secretary, was on the one hand, as official representative of his government, rejecting this offer, while on the other, as a member of the opposition to Hitler's war course, informing London about the impending signing of the Moscow pact. In the meantime the Dictator was already announcing to the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces on 22 August 1939 the actual fact of the German-Soviet Agreement, which put the army in a position to smash Poland in an isolated action according to plan 132 . In this speech Hitler declared that the Reich was being forced by economic factors among others into making war. No doubt this assertion also served the Fuehrer in proving the rightness of his Program. Regarded objectively, however, that is in the context of the social situation and functional fabric of power politics and economics in Germany in 1939, it does allow us a glimpse into connections and interdependencies which till now could only be intimated. Our economic position, as a result of our restrictions, has become such that we can only hold out a few more years. Goering can confirm that. No other alternative remains open to us, we will have to act...' 133
The economy which had been totally geared to a war of plunder according to Hitler's Program, was now demanding its tribute. Hitler intended solving these economic problems which were in accord with the demands of his Stufenplan , not by means of peaceful expansion, but in a warlike atavistic fashion. On 23 August 1939, the world heard about the signing of the German-Russian Pact, without being informed about the additional clauses, which in practice provided for a partition of Poland 134 . Two days later, with a mixture of tactics and truth, Hitler made his last "generous offer" to Great Britain to achieve his old goal of an alliance with Britain 135 . What cannot be overlooked, however, is that even in this connection the Polish question could evidently not be subject for negotiation for Hitler! But with reference to colonial affairs he let the British Ambassador, Nevile Henderson, know 136 that these would only become of acute concern in three, four or five years time. Perhaps from the point of view of the long-term overseas aims, it becomes evident why Great Britain, in the light of the rapid rearmament of the German navy, did not agree to the seemingly generous offer of the Dictator 137 .
The Dahlerus Mission 138 , initiated, interestingly enough, by Goering in the last days of August 1939 in an attempt to save the peace, was bound to break down since Great Britain was not willing to submit to Hitler's ultimatum. The Fuehrer, however, had not signed the pact with the "devil" in order to have to negotiate further or make what to him appeared trifling alterations to frontiers, but in order to be able at last to let loose an attack and overrun nations in lightning campaigns. According to past experience and the quite one-sided information conveyed to him 139 , Hitler believed he could count on British neutrality in such an event. When the British declaration of war was delivered on 3 September 1939, only a few hours before the French, the war on two fronts, in the East and West, appeared to Hitler as a conflict forced on him at a most inopportune time. His concept of conducting separate Blitzkriege and conquering Europe in stages under the shelter of British neutrality, had failed. Would he succeed just once more in altering the course of fate, or would the coming events persuade him to give up his Stufenplan , his program of expansion?
References:
101. National Archives Washington, TΓÇô77, 642; OKW/Ausl. VII, Bericht 2: Lammers an Epp, RM No. 747/39 A, 9.3.1939, reprinted in: Hildebrand, Vom Reich zum Weltreich , Doc. 58a.
102.See Salewski, Seekriegsleitung , loc. cit.; idem, Selbstverstaendnis der Kriegsmarine , p. 78, and J. Duelffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine , loc. cit.
103.Cf. the essay by O. Grochler, Kolonialforderungen als Teil der faschistischen Kriegszielplanungen', in: Zeitschrift fuer Militaergeschichte 5 (1965), pp. 547 ff.
104. ADAP , D, V, No. 19, pp. 127 ff.
105.See Booms, Ursprung , pp. 346 ff.
106. ADAP , D, IV, No. 391, p. 438 f.
107. DBFP , III series, vol. 4, No. 195, pp. 210 ff.
108.Bundesarchiv Koblenz, ZSG 101/12, p. 84, quoted by Booms, Ursprung , p. 353.
109.Text of the speech in: M. Freund, Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges in Dokumenten , Freiburg/Munich 1953 ff., vol. 2, No. 9, pp. 16 ff.
110.On the controversy cf. Hildebrand, Vom Reich zum Weltreich , p. 607 f.
111.G. Niedhart (Mannheim) is preparing a special examination into this. Generally on German-Polish relations in 1939 see Zagorniak, Les pr├ëparatifs allemands de l'attaque contre la Pologne', in: Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale 1970 , and Jedruzczak, La Pologne et la genèse de la 2ème guerre mondiale', in: ibid. Also A. M. Cienciala, Poland and the Western Powers 1938ΓÇô1939 , London/Toronto, 1968. For a more complete view on the general problem of the outbreak of the Second World War see: L. Mosley, On Borrowed Time. How World War II Began , London, 1969.
112.C. J. Burckhardt, Meine Danziger Mission 1937ΓÇô1939 , Munich, 1960, p. 241.
113.On von Ribbentrop's (admittedly failed) conception of forging a German-Japanese alliance as a front against Great Britain, and not, as Tokyo wanted it, against the USSR, cf. A. Hillgruber, Zum Kriegsbeginn im September 1939', in: Oesterreichische Militaerische Zeitschrift 1969 (H.5), p. 358 f.
114.See Duelffer, Weimar, Hitler und Marine , loc. cit.
115.See generally the study of diplomatic history by A. A. Offner, American Appeasement: United States Foreign Policy and Germany, 1933ΓÇô1938 , Cambridge/Mass., 1969.
116. ADAP , D, I, 423, p. 535.
117. VB of 29 April 1939.
118.See also S. Friedlaender, Auftakt zum Untergang, Hitler und die USA , Stuttgart/Berlin/Cologne/Mainz, 1965, passim.
119. ADAP , D, VI, No. 283, p. 297 f.
120.See Gemzell, Raeder, pp. 180 ff. and Salewski, Selbstverstaendnis der Kriegsmarine , p. 78. What seems particularly noteworthy is that according to the reflection of the 2nd Air Fleet, a war against Britain was regarded as hopeless.
121. ADAP , D, VI No. 433, pp. 477 ff.
121a. See also von Ribbentrop's address of 24 January 1939 to generals and admirals on behalf of the Supreme Command, in: Bundesarchiv/Militaerarchiv Freiburg, Case 553 PG 33 613. The author thanks Dr J. Duelffer for drawing his attention to this document.
122.See p. 7 and p. 81 of this work.
123.A.S. Milward, Die deutsche Kriegswirtschaft 1939ΓÇô1945 , Stuttgart, 1966, esp. pp. 9 ff. and D. Eichholtz, Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft , vol. I: 1939ΓÇô1941, Berlin, 1969.
124.See Niedhart, Grossbritannien und die Sowjetunion , pp. 327 ff.
125.On earlier considerations cf. D. N. Lammers, Britain, Russia and the Revival of "Entente Diplomacy": 1934' in: Journal of British Studies , 6 (1967), pp. 99 ff.
126.See A. Hillgruber, Die sowjetische Aussenpolitik 1939ΓÇô1945', in: Osteuropa-Handbuch, Sowjetunion: Aussenpolitik , loc. cit.
127.See p. 73.
128. ADAP , D, VI, No. 521, p. 598 f.
129.See also: H. Metzmacher, Deutsch-englische Ausgleichsbemuehungen im Sommer 1939', in: VfZg 14 (1966), pp. 369 ff.
130.Cf. in detail Hildebrand, Vom Reich zum Weltreich , pp. 607 ff.
131.Burckhardt, Danziger Mission , p. 348.
131a. On the British estimation of the German naval armaments cf. Public Record Office (London), FO 371/23 054, Harrison to Kirkpatrick on 19 June 1939 apropos Raeder's speech on 9 June 1939 in Stuttgart. The author wishes to thank Dr J. Henke for drawing his attention to this document.
132. ADAP , D, VII, No. 192, pp. 167 ff. On the question of sources here, see W. Baumgart, Zur Ansprache Hitlers vor den Fuehrern der Wehrmacht am 22. August 1939. Eine quellenkritische Untersuchung', in: Vierteljahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte 16 (1968), pp. 120 ff.
133.Ibid. On the general problem see also B. A. Carroll, Design for Total War. Arms and Economics in the Third Reich , The Hague/Paris, 1968, and particularly T. W. Mason, introduction to an edition in preparation of economic historical sources of the Third Reich.
136.R. Coulondre, De Staline à Hitler. Souvenirs de deux ambassades 1936ΓÇô1939 , Paris, 1950, p. 293.
137.See the study by Zieb, Logistik , loc. cit.
138.B. Dahlers, Der letzte Versuch. London-Berlin Sommer 1939 , Munich, 1948. On the basis of Cabinet papers, D. C. Watt in Enter Dahlerus', in: The Spectator of 31 January 1970, p. 142 f., proves that the last attempt' was not concluded in the summer of 1939 but was continued up until December 1939. See p. 101 of this work also.
139.A fundamental study has not yet been made of Hitler's system of information and on the level of actual information, which he did in fact have.
